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Abstract 
 
 Implementing incentive systems can sometimes backfire in practice: experimental 
evidence and folklore both suggest that offers of explicit rewards can expose surprising 
discontinuities in behaviour. This paper models two such discontinuities that have been 
claimed by psychologists and experimental economists to constitute important exceptions to 
the standard economic theory of human motivation. The first (“type discontinuity”) is the 
observation of a discontinuity in the distribution across population types of values of the 
willingness to accept payment in return for performing certain (“civic”) actions, such as 
giving blood or performing public service. It is claimed that this distribution is bimodal, even 
discontinuous: many people have a zero WTA, many have a large positive WTA, but nobody 
has a small positive WTA. The second (“payment discontinuity”, also known as “crowding-
out”) is that people who are willing to perform certain actions for free will refuse to perform 
them for a low price, even if they subsequently agree to perform them if the price is raised 
enough. Civic virtue may, on this view, be crowded out by the introduction of explicit 
incentives; people may stop doing things they were previously prepared to do without 
reward. The paper shows that both phenomena may be observed as a result of individuals’ 
acting in a first period of public service in the knowledge that the terms of their action signal 
their type, and their type will affect a process of assortative matching in a second period. 
Type Discontinuity, but not Payment Discontinuity, is observed in a signaling game in which 
individuals announce the prices at which they will perform a civic action. Payment 
Discontinuity, but not Type Discontinuity, is observed in a screening game in which 
individuals have only a binary participation decision available to signal their type. The 
proportion of individuals participating when rewards are zero can be higher than when 
rewards are positive but small.  
 
Keywords : crowding effect, intrinsic motivation, assortative matching, economic 
psychology, incentive schemes 
JEL codes: A12, C70, D10, D60, H41, J22 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Emmanuelle Auriol, Ernst Fehr, Jennifer Gann, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole for valuable 
discussions on these questions, as well as participants in the Workshop on Social Norms at the 
Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin during my visit there in December 2001. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 Are people who demand small bribes almost as honest as people who demand no 
bribes at all? Is selling something for a very low price almost equivalent to giving it as a gift? 
And can offering someone a small fee make them less willing to do something they would 
gladly have undertaken for free? 
 Implementing incentive systems can sometimes backfire in practice: experimental 
evidence and folklore both suggest that offers of explicit rewards can expose surprising 
discontinuities in behaviour. Economists brought up on incentive theory tend to believe that a 
small reward is, though small, a genuine reward, and should be expected to increase people’s 
motivation. Yet they may be surprised to observe that small rewards can sometimes be 
scorned by those to whom they are offered; conversely, those who accept or solicit small 
rewards can be disdained by others. More dramatically, some kinds of action that would be 
considered intrinsically acceptable or even admirable are considered “tainted” or repugnant 
when undertaken for a reward, even a large one (an example is the donation of a kidney, 
which is considered admirable when undertaken without reward, but “morally offensive and 
ethically indefensible” when undertaken for sale, to cite one contribution to the debate on the 
passage of the US National Organ Transplant Act)2.  
Can we understand the nature of the discontinuity here? In fact there is not one 
discontinuity but two, and as will be seen these are quite distinct even though they are often 
                                                 
2 See Gann (2001) who writes: “In September 1999 an individual offered his right kidney for 
sale on eBay, an internet based auction site.  In America, where there are over 47,000 
patients awaiting kidney transplants, and where the average wait for a kidney transplant 
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confused. One is a discontinuity of behaviour in the space of types, while the other is a 
discontinuity of behaviour in the space of incentives. The first (the Type Discontinuity) is the 
observation of a discontinuity in the distribution across the population of values of the 
willingness to accept payment in return for performing certain (“civic”) actions, such as 
giving blood or performing public service. It is claimed that this distribution is bimodal, even 
discontinuous: we may see some individuals willing to perform these actions for free and 
some willing to do so only for a significant payment, but we will rarely see the intermediate 
case where some individuals perform them only for a small payment. Furthermore the 
reactions of others to the intermediate case tends to reinforce the discontinuity: people with a 
low but positive willingness-to-accept may be stigmatized as “cheap”, but people willing to 
act for free are not considered even cheaper.  
 
The second (the Payment Discontinuity) is also known more familiarly in the 
literature on economic psychology as “crowding-out”. This is the finding that people who are 
willing to perform certain actions for free will refuse to perform them for a low price, even if 
they subsequently agree to perform them if the price is raised enough. Civic virtue may, on 
this view, be crowded out by the introduction of explicit incentives; people may stop doing 
things they were previously prepared to do without reward.  
 
These two alleged discontinuities are quite distinct from each other. The Type 
Discontinuity is a claim about the distribution of values of the willingness to accept payment; 
                                                                                                                                                       
nearly doubled between 1988 and 1996, this excited considerable interest.  The bidding had 
reached $5.8 million before being shut down by the administrators of eBay”.  
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it is compatible with an entirely orthodox interpretation of WTA. The Payment 
Discontinuity, by contrast, appears to cast doubt on the very concept of WTA according to 
which higher associated payments always make a given option more attractive. In fact, as 
will be seen below, both can be reconciled with more orthodox accounts of motivation; the 
difference between them will lie in the nature of the actions available to agents and the 
interpretation that others place upon them. 
 
In section 2 I briefly survey evidence for the Payment Discontinuity, and discuss 
explanations that have been advanced for it. I point out that such explanations, though often 
both intuitively and empirically plausible, rely upon an unexplained difference in the 
perception by individuals of the commercial and voluntaristic behaviour, which it should be a 
part of the theory to explain (in a sense they make the Type Discontinuity a part of the 
explanation for the Payment Discontinuity). In section 3, therefore, I propose a simple 
economic model to explain both discontinuities. I also show that the circumstances that 
favour the Type Discontinuity do not necessarily favour the Payment Discontinuity, which is 
observed under somewhat more restrictive circumstances. Section 4 summarises and 
concludes. 
 
In contrast to the Payment Discontinuity, the Type Discontinuity as such has been 
subjected to much less careful investigation. The evidence for it is more casual and anecdotal 
(it is often regarded as so obvious as to be a plausible component of the explanation for the 
Payment Discontinuity). To make it plausible let me ask the reader to consider our highly 
different reactions to two pairs of cases: 
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• In the first variant of the first case, imagine going to a politician who has 
undertaken to raise in your country’s parliament an issue affecting your civil 
rights. He explains that there are costs associated with the preparation of your 
dossier and you are required to pay an official fee, based on a published tariff, 
equal to a hundred dollars. However, he will devote himself enthusiastically to 
pursuing your cause. You return the next week and he apologises profusely 
but says there has been a rise in the published tariff of fees so that you must 
now pay two hundred dollars 
• In the second variant of the first case, when you return the next week, he 
explains that he has realized that it will be lot more effort to prepare your case 
than he had realized, and that he therefore requests you to pay him, in addition 
to the published fee of a hundred dollars, a small bribe of one hundred dollars 
to make it worth his while. 
• In the first variant of the second case, you need a transfusion of a rare blood 
type. You learn that a donor has been found who has donated his blood. You 
pay the transfusion service a hundred-dollar administration fee. 
• In the second variant of the second case, the transfusion service charges you 
nothing but says that the donor has asked a price of a hundred dollars for 
selling you the blood. 
 
By understanding why we react so differently to the behaviour of the parties in each 
of these pairs of cases, I suggest we can understand why individuals do not consider that 
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making gifts can be considered close to making sales for low prices, nor that taking small 
bribes is close to taking no bribes at all. And we would not expect to observe many people 
asking for very small bribes. If they ask at all, they will demand significant sums. 
 
 
2. Markets and the “crowding-out” of reciprocity 
 
 So what evidence is there for the Payment Discontinuity? A number of writers, 
beginning most famously with Richard Titmuss (1970), have claimed that giving explicit 
(and usually but not necessarily monetary) compensation to individuals can undermine their 
sense of civic duty, specifically by diminishing their willingness to do things for the public 
good that they would have been entirely willing to do for free. Titmuss suggested that this 
might be particularly true of the market for blood. He claimed that paying donors negatively 
affected their willingness to donate blood, thereby leading to dominance among blood donors 
of those who needed to donate for financial reasons, whose blood was likely to be medically 
much less suitable. Titmuss himself did not provide convincing empirical evidence in support 
of his claim; other authors such as Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) agreed with him that 
altruistic motivation might be important but assumed that price incentives could be regarded 
as additive, so that the supply curve for blood would be positively sloped in the standard 
way. 
 
 As far as I am aware there has been no more recent empirical work on the market for 
blood that might allow Titmuss’s claim to be more rigorously tested (though Gann, 2001, 
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develops a theoretical model which takes his motivational assumptions for granted and shows 
their consequences for the quality of aggregate blood supply). But empirical work in other 
contexts by a number of researchers suggests the possibility of crowding-out of civic virtue 
should be taken very seriously (see Frey & Jegen, 2001, for an overview). One of the best-
known early studies was by Deci (1971) who suggested that paying experimental subjects to 
solve puzzles during an experiment decreases their subsequent willingness to solve such 
puzzles for fun. Gneezy & Rustichini (2000a) show that when children doing volunteer work 
(going from house to house collecting donations for charity) are paid a small monetary 
reward, the intensity with which they work declines, though it recovers again with 
subsequent increases in the level of payment. They call the effect “pay enough or don’t pay 
at all”, and although this is clearly interpretable as a crowding-out effect, a similar phrase 
might be used to describe the Type Discontinuity. The same authors (Gneezy & Rustichini, 
2000b) also report an experiment in which the introduction of a fine for parents who 
collected their children late from kindergarten increased the rate of late collection (a 
phenomenon they interpret as being due to the fact that the possibility of paying for late 
collection reduces the perceived element of social disapproval) 
 
Bruno Frey and co-authors (Frey et.al., 1996; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) have 
suggested that willingness of individuals to contribute to public goods may be undermined by 
explicit payment. In particular, they draw on survey evidence of people’s willingness to 
accept privately noxious but socially necessary facilities (such as nuclear waste recycling 
plants). This evidence reveals that offering compensation does not increase the acceptability 
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of such projects, and indeed often elicits complaints about “bribery”; the authors interpret 
these findings as due to the “crowding-out” of public spirit by private incentives.  
 
There remain some unresolved issues about how to interpret these findings (see Fehr 
& Falk, 2001). Some of these unresolved issues are directly empirical – such as whether 
people’s reported willingness to accept is a reliable indicator of their actual willingness to 
accept in practice (there are significant discrepancies between the two in the results reported 
by Frey et.al., 1996). Some have to do with the difficulty of designing experiments to control 
for other effects than those strictly describable as crowding-out (often negative reciprocity 
and loss aversion may be present in the same context, for instance – see Fehr & Falk, 2001, 
p.37). Some have to do with the difficulty of knowing what signals are being perceived by 
subjects in the experimental contexts (including signals about the social norms that are 
relevant to that context) and therefore to what non-experimental settings the findings could 
be considered relevant. Nevertheless, prima facie evidence for crowding-out has appeared 
often enough for it to be worth considering what motivational foundations could explain such 
a phenomenon. 
 
 Most theoretical explanations appeal to the presence of two distinct sources of 
motivation, sometimes known as extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; the first suggests that the 
actions concerned are performed in order to achieve some other end (such as payment), while 
the second suggests that the action yields satisfaction or pleasure in itself. For reasons that 
are then usually left unexplained, the nature of the extrinsic motivation interacts with the 
strength of the intrinsic motivation in some way, the two nevertheless remaining quite 
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distinct arguments of the utility function3. For instance, Frey & Oberholzer-Gee (1997) 
suppose that individuals gain utility from ordinary consumption (and thereby indirectly from 
money), but also from “behaving in an altruistic manner or living up to her civic duty”. 
Offering payment for actions that are thought to be part of an individual’s civic duty 
increases that person’s consumption possibilities but reduces her utility from behaving 
altruistically. It may therefore reduce an individual’s utility overall, and may therefore reduce 
the willingness to undertake such actions. A similar mechanism is invoked by Gann to 
explain reduced supply of blood when payments are made. “Giving blood” and “selling 
blood” are thus considered two distinct kinds of activity, the former yielding some intrinsic 
utility but the other not. Offering payment transforms the former activity into the latter, 
implying a utility loss. 
 
 There are two limitations of this theoretical approach, which are my reason for 
outlining a different framework. There is nothing at all implausible about the claim that 
individuals may be altruistically motivated4, and whether this motivation is best captured by 
adding arguments to the utility function depends on the problem in hand (there are clearly 
some kinds of altruism that do not increase the person’s well-being, in that they reflect duty 
rather than delight, and may move the individual to action even though she may heartily wish 
                                                 
3 This is not true of Bénabou & Tirole (2003), who suggest an interesting mechanism 
whereby offers of explicit incentives by an informed principal signals something to an agent 
about her own type, and this type information interacts with intrinsic motivation. In the 
model of this paper, by contrast, the principal has no private information. 
4 There are also many examples of individuals creating public goods for free when these arise 
as by-products of activities that are privately valuable for them. See Bessen (2001) on the 
open-source software movement. 
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she did not have that particular duty5). However, there is something rather arbitrary about 
supposing that feelings of altruism attach to actions performed purely under certain 
descriptions, and that an action with identical consequences might not elicit altruism even if 
the person concerned knew the consequences were the same. It is not that such framing 
effects are necessarily implausible (framing is a pervasive experimental phenomenon6), but 
they are certainly arbitrary. There seems no more general account of why two actions may be 
described in ways that elicit such different reactions, nor why such descriptions could be 
stable under reflective consideration of the consequences7. I suggest that it should be part of 
the goal of the theory to explain why giving and selling are considered to be radically 
different activities, and that such a distinction should ideally not be presumed from the 
outset. 
 
 The almost comic arbitrariness of such descriptions is turned to good effect in Mark 
Twain’s Adventures of Tom Sawyer: 
 
“[Tom] had discovered a great law of human action, without knowing it - namely, 
that in order to make a man or a boy covet a thing, it is only necessary to make the 
thing difficult to attain. If he had been a great and wise philosopher, like the writer of 
this book, he would now have comprehended that Work consists of whatever a body 
                                                 
5 A similar point underlies Sen’s famous distinction between “sympathy” and “commitment” 
(Sen, 1977). 
6 See most obviously Kahneman & Tversky (1979). 
7 Robert Nozick replied to an argument of Bernard Williams about doctoring being an 
activity that was intrinsically about curing patients by asking what distinguished it from 
“schmoctoring”, which was just like doctoring except that its purpose was to make money for 
the practitioners. 
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is obliged to do, and that Play consists of whatever a body is not obliged to do. And 
this would help him to understand why constructing artificial flowers or performing 
on a treadmill is work, why rolling tenpins or climbing Mont Blanc is only 
amusement. There are wealthy gentlemen in England who drive four-horse passenger 
coaches twenty or thirty miles on a daily line in the summer, because the privilege 
costs them considerable money; but if they were offered wages for the service, that 
would turn it into work, and then they would resign”. 
 
 The second shortcoming of the theory is that it implies considerable short-sightedness 
among agents, since an agent who wished to continue to enjoy the warm glow attached to 
performing her civic duty could simply give the money she receives to a charity and think of 
the action as not only a performance of her civic duty but also a form of “raising money for 
good causes”. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence that in some contexts people do indeed 
reason in this way (some academic journals pay referees a – fairly miserable – fee but then 
invite them to donate the fee to charity). Nevertheless, if they always reasoned thus there 
would be no crowding out effect, and it is hard to think that crowding out arises, if indeed it 
does, purely because of agents’ stupidity. 
 
 I want instead to propose that the reason why individuals may reject monetary 
payments for actions they would perform for free is, at least partly, a desire to send a signal 
to other individuals about the type of person they are8. Now it might be thought that this 
                                                 
8 This does not rule out the possibility that individuals may also wish to send signals to 
themselves (an important theory along these lines with application to crowding out has been 
developed by Benabou & Tirole, 2003). Seabright (2001) discusses this possibility in relation 
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merely replaces one type of arbitrariness by another, but as will be seen the model derives a 
qualitative discontinuity between the signals sent by individuals even though there is no 
discontinuity between their types. Some individuals perform certain civic actions for free, 
while others do so for payment, but the lowest payment demanded by anyone is significantly 
above zero. 
 
 The key to the result is the way in which individuals benefit from being recognised by 
others as of a particular type, namely the type that does civic actions for free. If this simply 
enabled individuals to gain greater monetary rewards in the future it is hard to see how it 
would be considered particularly meritorious. On the other hand, if it simply gave people 
greater psychic rewards we would be replacing the arbitrary psychic rewards of performing 
one’s civic duty with the no less arbitrary psychic rewards of being recognised as performing 
one’s civic duty. 
 
 Instead I propose that the main rewards that come from signalling one’s performance 
of one’s civic duty consist in the increased likelihood of subsequent interaction with other 
people who also perform their civic duty. Human social life is full of networking and 
interaction. Only very rarely do we interact with a whole mass of our fellow citizens; much 
                                                                                                                                                       
to the theory of consumer branding: “in principle one could imagine two main kinds of 
rationale. One, which is compatible with modern evolutionary psychology, is that individuals 
may have within themselves multiple centres of cognition and reasoning (see Dennett, 1995; 
Pinker, 1998) which find it valuable sometimes to communicate through the external world 
rather than internal neural channels, perhaps because internal communication suffers from a 
lack of credibility. I tell myself I am rich, good-looking and successful; to silence the 
skepticism of my inner voice I behave in ways that make it seem more likely to myself that I 
am indeed rich, good-looking and successful. Another explanation is that consumers may 
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more often we interact in families, workgroup, societies, associations and all the multifarious 
institutions of civil society. All of these institutions benefit from reciprocal behaviour, and 
the quality of life that you enjoy in such institutions is determined not only by what you bring 
to the interaction yourself but also by the kinds of people with whom you interact. 
 
 There has been much work recently examining the characteristics of institutions in 
which the benefits of association to an individual depend upon both that individual’s 
characteristics and the characteristics of the other members (Shimer & Smith, 2000). Such 
phenomena have been applied to understanding growing inequality in household income 
(Deaton, 1995; Lerman, 1996), poverty traps in developing economies (Kremer, 1993), peer-
group lending in poor countries (Ghatak, 1999), rising divorce rates (Weiss, 1993), 
transmission rates of HIV infection (Dow and Philipson, 1996), racial and class segregation 
in the schooling system (Benabou, 1994) and the changing employment structure of US firms 
(Kremer & Maskin, 1996; Acemoglu, 1998; Mailath et.al., 2000). A key feature of such 
institutions is that they give rise to what is called “assortative matching”. Individuals scoring 
highly on some relevant (utility- or productivity-enhancing) feature tend to match with other 
individuals who also score highly on that feature, and low-scoring individuals match with 
other low-scoring individuals. The reason for this is that although everyone may wish to 
match with the high-scoring individuals, individuals who are themselves high-scoring have a 
greater ability to bid for such matches. One consequence of it is that low-scoring individuals 
suffer twice over; once from their own low score and once from the low score of the other 
individuals with whom they are obliged to interact.  
                                                                                                                                                       
find out about their own characteristics through consumption decisions: I do not know how 
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 In this model, therefore, I shall propose that individuals differ in the extent to which 
they derive benefits from performing some civic action. Individuals who benefit greatly from 
doing so, and who can credibly signal that they do, will tend in subsequent social interactions 
to be matched with other individuals who also benefit from performing the civic action. Both 
are likely to enjoy enhanced welfare as a result. 
 
 The result is that those individuals whose benefits from performing the civic action 
are above some threshold level will do so for free, while all others will do so only for a fee. 
The fee demanded by those whose benefits are only just below the threshold level is 
substantially above zero, since by revealing that they are not in the “civic virtue” group they 
forgo they chance of associating in the future with highly civically virtuous individuals. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
fit I am until I go to the gym, I do not know whether I like caviar till I try it, and so on”. 
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3. A model of commercial and voluntaristic transactions 
 
 In this model there is a continuum of individuals who each live for two periods. There 
is no discounting. In the first period they engage in a public (“civic”) activity, while in the 
second they match with other individuals and engage in a private activity. While the civic 
activity creates benefits for other members of society, these benefits play no intrinsic part in 
the analysis that follows and therefore do not need to be explicitly defined. However, 
individuals differ in the extent to which they are motivated by acting for the good of society. 
An individual i has a twice continuously differentiable utility function Ui(mi,ci,bi,θi,θj), where 
 
mi is the individual’s holding of a money numeraire 
ci is the cost to the individual of performing the public activity 
bi is the benefit to the individual of performing the public activity 
θi is the individual’s type 
θj is the type of the individual with whom she is matched. 
 
 
We suppose that the utility can be written as follows: 
 
(1)  Ui(mi,ci,bi,θi,θj) = mi - c + bi(θi) + Vi(θi,θj) 
 
with ∂bi(θi)/∂θi > 0, ∂Vi(θi,θj)/∂θi > 0, ∂Vi(θi,θj)/∂θj > 0 and ∂2Vi(θi,θj)/∂θi∂θj > 0. 
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 This implies that the costs of performing the civic action are identical (and common 
knowledge) across individuals, while the benefits are an increasing function of the 
individual’s type. The utility V(.) from the private activity is a function of the types of both 
the individual and the matched partner. 
 
Actions take place in this model in one of two ways:  
 
• the first is a signalling game, in which the public authority first announces a 
threshold price p*, and individuals then announce a non-negative price pi at 
which they will be willing to engage in the civic activity. Those who have 
announced prices below p* participate in the public activity, receiving their 
announced price; all others receive a reservation utility normalised to zero. In 
the second period individuals are matched with each other. We assume that 
the matching process randomly matches those who have the same expected 
type conditional on their first period action9.  
• The second is a screening game, in which the public authority announces a 
price p′ at which participation in the civic activity will be remunerated; all 
individuals who choose to participate receive this price. Then each individual 
announces a participation decision ai after which participation takes place, 
                                                 
9 We do not model the matching process explicitly but draw on the standard findings in the 
literature. 
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then individuals are matched with others according to their expected type 
conditional on their participation decision.  
 
To summarize, in the signalling game, an action profile is a function pi = h(θi, p*) 
where pi ∈ [0,∞). In the screening game, an action profile is a function ai  = g(θi,p′) where ai 
∈ {0,1}. 
 
In both games we look for a Nash Equilibrium, subject to the constraint that in the 
second period individuals are matched with those that have the same expected type 
conditional on their first period action10. We suppose that there is a distribution F(θ) of types 
θ along an interval [θL,θH], where θL < c < θH. We assume that θH is sufficiently high that 
some individuals will wish to announce zero prices, while θL is sufficiently low that some 
individuals will wish to announce positive prices. For simplicity, we also assume bi(θi) = θi , 
so that types can be considered as indexed by the benefits they gain from the public activity. 
Together these assumptions imply that there are some individuals who would prefer not to 
engage in the public activity without payment while there are others who benefit from doing 
so even without payment.  
 
It will be useful to define vH(θi) as the expected utility of an individual of type θi in 
the second period if she pools with all weakly higher types θj ≥ θi, that is, if she is matched at 
random with one of the set of all individuals with types (weakly) higher than her own. 
                                                 
10 This is not strictly a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium since no actions are chosen in the 
second period, but the conditions on the expectations are the same as in a PBE. 
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Similarly define vL(θi) as the expected utility of an individual of type θi in the second period 
if she pools with all (weakly) lower types θj ≤ θi. We can also define wH(θi,θk) and wL(θi,θk) 
as the expected utility of an individual of type θi in the second period if she pools with all 
(weakly) lower types than type θk  (not necessarily her own). Of course, vH(θi)= wH(θi,θk)  
and vL(θi)= wL(θi,θk)  whenever k=i. 
 
 We first show that announced prices in the signalling game are discontinuous in θ: 
 
Proposition 1 (Type Discontinuity): 
 
 In any equilibrium of the signalling game, there exists a threshold value θ* such that 
all individuals of type θ>θ* announce a zero price, and all individuals of lower type 
announce prices that are strictly greater than zero.  
 
Proof:  
 
I first assume, and later prove, that all and only the individuals with a type above 
some threshold value θ* announce zero prices. In effect they announce that they are willing 
to participate in the activity for free (as a “gift”). Then in equilibrium each will be matched in 
the second period with an individual chosen at random from all those whose type is higher 
than θ*. The expected utility of an individual announcing a price of zero is:  
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An individual who announces a positive price, however, faces a calculation of a 
somewhat different kind. In equilibrium she will be matched with another individual who has 
announced the same price and who therefore reveals herself to be the same type. To see this, 
first define φ(p, θi) as follows: 
 
(3)         ( ) ( )[ ]ppVEpV jjiii =≡ θθθφθ ,),,(  
 
Intuitively φ(p, θi) can be interpreted as the “certainty equivalent type” with whom, if type 
θi  were paired, she would receive the same utility as the expected utility she receives from 
being matched randomly with all those with whom she in fact pools. Now write her expected 
utility from announcing a price pi as follows:  
 
(4)    ( )[ ] ( )( )iiiiiiijiiiii pVpcmpbcmUE θφθθθθ ,,0,,,, +++−=>  
 
If she is maximising her utility we can write the first-order condition as follows: 
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However, we also know from the conditions on the utility function that 
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from which we know that equation (5) will not be satisfied by the same value of pi at any two 
different values of θi. Given that her announcement perfectly reveals her type she will 
therefore be matched with an individual of her own type. In equilibrium her expected utility 
can therefore be written as follows:  
 
 
(7)        ( )[ ] ( )iiiiiijiiiii VcpmpbcmUE θθθθθ ,0,,,, ++−+=>  
 
Define individual of type θ* as one who is just indifferent between announcing a zero price 
and announcing the positive price that maximises her expected utility. For such an individual, 
setting equations (2) and (7) equal yields:  
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from which it follows that pi must be strictly greater than zero. Denote this value by pi(θ*). 
 
It remains to be shown, first, that if an individual of type θi announces a zero price, then all 
individuals of type θk >θi also do so (the assumptions on θL and θH ensure that such an 
individual exists, and also that not all individuals announce zero prices). The assertion 
follows from differentiating equation (5) and using equation (6) to show that 
 
(9)        
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Thus if any individual of type θi is dissuaded from announcing a positive price by the 
reduction in the expected quality of her match, an individual of higher type will be even more 
dissuaded. The fact that the utility function is linear in money ensures that the higher type 
cannot be recompensed for this by a higher marginal utility of money. QED. 
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 Figure 1 illustrates. The broken horizontal line represents the cost of participating in 
the civic activity while the two positively sloped dark lines represent the benefits (summed 
over both periods) under alternative assumptions about matching in the second period. The 
convex line shows the benefit of participation under the hypothesis that the individual is 
matched precisely with another of her type (call this “perfect matching”). The straight line is 
the benefit of participation under the assumption that the individual is matched at random 
with the set of individuals that are of weakly higher type than her (call this “pooling”). (The 
fact that one is drawn convex and the other straight is unimportant; what matters is that the 
former is steeper than the latter.) For the highest values of θ the individual would prefer 
perfect matching, but is unable to find a way to signal her type because of the non-negativity 
constraint on announced prices. For values below where the two dark lines cross the 
individual prefers pooling with other (higher) types, until we reach types below θ*, at which 
point the positive price that the individual could announce while separating from the types 
lower than her own is just high enough to outweigh the benefits of pooling. At θ* this price is 
strictly positive because here the benefits of participation under perfect matching must be 
lower than the benefits under pooling with individuals of higher type. Here, precisely, we see 
the Type Discontinuity hypothesis, describable by the phrase of Gneezy & Rustichini: “pay 
enough or don’t pay at all”. 
  
 As drawn, this price yields significant rents to the individual of type θ*, since her 
gross benefits of participation are significantly higher than the costs. How large precisely will 
these rents be? The answer depends on p*, the threshold price announced by the public 
authority. At that price the marginal participant will be the one for whom participation rents 
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are zero, namely the one for whom p* - c + θ + V(θ,θ) = 0. Proposition 2 shows that under 
separation, rents to participation are strictly increasing in θ, so that all participants of higher 
type than the marginal participant receive strictly positive rents. 
 
Proposition 2 (Rents under separation increasing in θ):  
 
R(θ) ≡ θ + V(θ,θ) + pi(θ) – c is increasing in θ. 
 
  
 
Proof: 
 
From equation (5) we know that in equilibrium 
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where we write ( )iii p θφφ ,≡ . 
 
Totally differentiating V(.) yields 
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Substituting (10) in (11) yields: 
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Totally differentiating the expression for rent, substituting (12) and using the envelope 
theorem yields:  
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Q.E.D. 
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Figure 2 illustrates, showing that the participation constraint is steeper than the incentive 
constraint, leaving participants who announce prices lower than p* with a strictly positive 
rent. The participation constraint (the minimum price at which individuals will participate) 
reaches zero at the point where the horizontal line representing cost of participation cuts the 
curve representing benefits under separation. Here the actual announced price as determined 
by the incentive constraint is still strictly positive. 
 
What about crowding out? In the signalling game there is no crowding out, as can be seen 
from noting that the proportion of individuals whose participation constraint is satisfied is 
strictly increasing in the threshold price p*. This is because the participation decision as such 
is not serving any signalling function. However, matters are quite different when we come to 
the screening game.  
 
Recall that in the screening game individuals are paid the price announced by the public 
authority, not the price they announce themselves. This means that, unlike in the signalling 
game, their participation decision is the only way they have to signal their type. Proposition 3 
shows that under these different conditions, and given an additional assumption about 
payoffs, there will indeed be crowding out. This is because individuals with high θ can signal 
this fact only by agreeing to participate when prices are zero and refusing to do so when 
prices are positive. For this to be a rational strategy, their gains from successful signalling 
have to increase faster in θ  than their direct gains from participation. Proposition 3 states 
more precisely what it means for this latter condition to hold. 
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Proposition 3 (Payment Discontinuity): 
 
Define θ* as in Proposition 1. If ∂[wH(θ,θk) - wL(θ,θk)] /∂θ >1 for all θk, there exists an 
equilibrium of the screening game in which, if the authority announces a price p′ = 0   all and 
only individuals with θi ≥ θ* participate in the civic activity, while if it announces a price 
within an interval of strictly positive prices there are threshold values of θ , one for each 
price within the interval, such that all and only individuals with values lower than the 
threshold participate, and the proportion of individuals participating is strictly lower than at 
p′ = 0. 
 
 
 
Proof: 
 
At an equilibrium with price p′ = 0 all and only individuals with θi ≥ θ* will participate by 
definition of θ*. Now define a price pL which is the lowest price at which the lowest-value 
type θL will participate, conditional on being the only participant. Consider a price p+> pL. 
Define θ+ as the value of θi at which individual i is just indifferent between participating and 
not participating, conditional on believing that only individuals with values θj < θ+ will 
participate. Then we can set the benefits of not participating equal to the benefits of 
participating, as follows: 
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(14) vH(θ+) = vL(θ+) + θ+ - c + p+ 
 
which implies 
 
(15) vH(θ+) - vL(θ+) = θ+ +  p+ - c 
 
Now consider the incentives for individuals with θ’ ≥ θ+. For each such individual to 
participate requires that  
 
(16) wH(θ’, θ+) - wL(θ’, θ+) ≥ θ’ +  p+ - c 
 
We can re-write equation (15) as 
 
(17) wH(θ+, θ+) - wL(θ+, θ+) ≥ θ+ +  p+ - c 
 
which we can subtract from (16) to yield 
 
(18) [wH(θ’, θ+) - wH(θ+, θ+)] – [wL(θ’, θ+) - wL(θ+, θ+)]  ≥  θ’ - θ+ 
 
If ∂[wH(θ,θk) - wL(θ,θk)] /∂θ >1 holds for all θk  then it holds in particular for θk = θ+, 
implying that ∂[wH(θ,θ+) - wL(θ,θ+)] /∂θ >1 which in turn implies equation (18). Thus we 
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can confirm that all individuals with θ ≥ θ+ will indeed participate while all those with θ < 
θ+ will not, and thus that this strategy constitutes a Nash equilibrium.  
 
Next, from the properties of the V(.) function (specifically the positive cross-partial 
derivative) we know that 
 
(19) vH(θ+) - vL(θ+) > wH(θ’, θ+) - wL(θ’, θ+)  for  θ’ >  θ+ 
 
This implies that θ+ is an increasing function of p+. By setting p+- pL positive but arbitrarily 
close to zero we can therefore make the proportion of individuals participating arbitrarily 
small. Define θC such that the proportion of individuals with θ < θC is the same as the 
proportion of individuals with θ > θ*, and define pC such that θ+ = θC when p+ = pC . For 
any p′ in the range  pL < p′ < pC the proportion of individuals participating will be strictly 
lower than the proportion participating at p′ = 0. QED. 
 
An important feature to note about this equilibrium is that it is a single equilibrium in which 
individuals’ strategy depends on the price announced. It should not be interpreted in terms of 
the existence of multiple equilibria (one for each of the prices announced), the possibility of 
which is a distinct question.  
  
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium with crowding-out. The two thick lines show the benefits 
of participating (shallow line) and not participating (steep line); reductions in p+ mean that θ+ 
can be set arbitrarily close to θL. 
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 So to summarise, Type Discontinuity is observed in the signalling game, but Payment 
Discontinuity is not. The reason is that for Payment Discontinuity to be observed (in this 
setting) requires participation itself (rather than the price of participation) to act as a signal of 
an individual’s type. Nevertheless, in a screening game in which price signalling plays no 
role, Payment Discontinuity is observed in an entirely intuitive way. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has suggested that a qualitative and discontinuous difference between gifts 
and sales, or free participation in civic activities and participation at a price, can emerge from 
signalling behaviour between individuals even without discontinuity in individuals’ types. It 
is the result of the fact that individuals like to associate with others, and that society’s 
matching processes tend to associate like with like.  
 
It will be evident therefore what answers the model gives to the two pairs of 
situations set out at the end of section 1 above. A politician might be thought to wish to 
signal himself as someone who derives large benefits from performance of his public duties, 
and who by virtue of this signal would expect to spend time in the future among other such 
people. By asking for a small bribe he effectively signals himself as someone whose benefits 
from fulfilling his public duties are small – substantially smaller than they might otherwise 
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have been estimated to be. A small bribe thereby causes him a significant reputational loss. If 
he asks for a bribe at all, it will be a large one. 
 
Similarly, someone who asks for a small price for donating their blood thereby 
reveals themself to be at best a reluctant altruist. To the extent that donating blood signals 
this fact to others, the reluctant altruist may thereby be substantially worse off. 
 
Crowding-out of civic motivation by price incentives may also occur, though it does 
not necessarily occur under the same conditions. Specifically, it occurs when the 
participation decision itself (rather than the announcement of the price at which one is willing 
to participate) serves as a signal of an individual’s type. One useful empirical implication of 
the result is that it implies that crowding-out is less likely to be observed when the context of 
the decision allows individuals many other means of signalling their commitment to civic 
virtue other than merely refusing to participate when a positive fee is offered11. 
 
There remain many interesting questions for further research, including the 
experimental testing of the results (the model implies that the observation of both 
discontinuity and crowding-out should be quite sensitive to the nature of the signalling 
opportunities open to subjects).  
 
                                                 
11 This may provide an explanation for the discrepancy in the results of Frey et.al. (1996) between the situation 
in which respondents were asked to state their willingness to accept payment for a waste disposal facility, and 
the situation in which they voted in secret ballot on whether or not to accept an actual offer. Under a secret 
ballot the opportunity to use a participation decision for signalling purposes was very limited. 
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One final observation is that the phenomena explored in this paper are by no means 
exotic or pathological. Most of us spend most of our time in association with others, with 
whom our interactions are not governed entirely or even mainly by either market relations or 
explicit reciprocity. We do many things for which the immediate return is not calculated, but 
we value associating with those we like or admire. Understanding the difference between 
explicitly reciprocal interaction and implicit association is an important task for any 
satisfactory theory of social life. 
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